The abundance of retail stores in Japan compared to what is observed in the U.S. and elsewhere is due in part to legal obstacles to the opening of large stores. These regulatory effects are measured by estimates of regression equations explaining variation in numbers of stores per household across Japan's 47 prefectures, and found not to be large enough to fully account for Japan's relative abundance of retail stores. A comparison of retailing cost data between Japan and the U.S. indicates that in Japan retailers' reorder costs are low. This and Japanese households' high storage costs imply that, apart from small but significant regulatory distortions, Japan's peculiar structure of retail trade is an efficient adaptation to the conditions of the country. In carrying out these investigations a new analytic model for explaining the geographic density of retail outlets in an economy is constructed.
In Japan, small retailers are particularly common. In 1982 there were 145.3 retail stores per 10,000 persons in Japan, compared to 82.9 for the United States,
The similar statistics for the United Kingdom, France, and West Germany were 62.7, 74.8 and 67.0, respectively. That Japan's distribution system is inefficient for having so many stores has become a cliche that appears in academic and journalistic writing on Japan as well as in U.S. government position papers.
There are two economic arguments on which the inefficiency claim has been based. One is the argument that Japan has a dualistic economy in which the distribution sector, unlike some other sectors, is economically backwards and riddled with anachronistic customs that have a cultural basis rather than an economic basis. In this view, the large number of stores in Japan is a symptom of economically wasteful overemployment in family enterprises, in Lewis' terminology: disguised unemployment. Patrick and Rholen (1987) have recently challenged the traditional dualism view, at least as regards current-day Japan, but only to replace it with an argument that is rather similar. They claim that those past retirement age (generally 55 years) and women are denied equal employment opportunities in anything other than family enterprise. Therefore they set up small stores (or become subcontractors) because economies of scale are least there and
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1 Keizai kikakucho (1986), Table 2 -4, p. 7. The cutoffs were 3000m^ in the largest cities and 1500m^ everywhere else; in fact almost all stores of larger floor space than these cutoffs had been department stores. Finally in 1978 this law was completely revamped so as to broaden its coverage to include all proposed new stores with floor space above 500m^.
The entire process of reviewing an application to establish a new store takes about a year. Though the authority to approve new stores is vested in MITI, the statutes oblige MITI to consider the recommendations of locally constituted panels of consumers, businessmen, and academics, regarding not only whether to approve applications but also regarding floor space, hours and days of operation, and location of proposed new stores. The U.S.
3 Tamura (1981), pp.1-14, and Tsuruta (1980), pp.13-27. analogue to these laws is local zoning. But local zoning in the U.S has had an opposite effect on the structure of retailing to that of Japan's laws pertaining to large stores. By separating commercial establishments from residential areas, local zoning in the U.S. has tended to favor larger stores over smaller ones. Mills and Ohta (1972) , p. 703. The Japanese laws favor small stores.
The Japanese laws requiring government approval for opening large stores were lobbied for by the proprietors of small stores and passed for no reason other than the protection of the owners of small stores. McCraw and O'Brien (1986) place great emphasis on these laws as the explanation for the large number of retail stores in Japan. Limited income, lack of storage facilities, and the strong preference for freshness led housewives to make frequent shopping trips, sometimes several daily. And of necessity they had to confine themselves to neighborhood shops....Thus, the lack of consumer mobility and the need to shop frequently have provided a powerful rationale for the existence of a large number of small stores. (p. 23)
It is natural to expect a link between shopping behavior and the geographic density of retail stores. The greater the density of stores the less is the distance from house to store for many consumers and the lower are the consumers' costs of making shopping trips. But the more retail outlets there are, the less are the scale economies in transporting goods from producers to retailers. There would seem to be social gains from having many retail outlets only if consumers' costs of storage and reorder are high relative to those of the retailers, that is if retailers' storage and reorder costs are low. In fact, a formal development of the argument confirms this intuition, and data suggest that in Japan compared to the U.S., households' storage costs are high and retailers' reorder costs are low, both of which favor more stores per person in Japan than in the U.S..
The remainder of this paper is devoted to constructing an analytic model for explaining the geographic density of retail outlets in an economy and applying the model to the query in the title. In the analytic model, the number of stores that minimizes the consumers' and retailers' combined storage and reorder costs given the demand, is precisely related to cost parameters and to the geographic density of households. In a statistical model, variation across Japan's 47 prefectures in numbers of stores per household is explained both by proxies for household storage and reorder costs (tatami mats per person, motor vehicles per household, and fraction of population residing in densely inhabited districts) and by the severity of regulations impeding large stores (measured by number of department stores per household). Regulatory effects are well identified but not extremely large. This finding leads to a search for the additional factors underlying the relative abundance of retail stores in Japan. A comparison of retail cost data for Japan and the U.S. reveals that retailers' reorder costs are relatively lower in Japan than in the U.S. for most kinds of business.
The main reason there are so many small stores in Japan is not regulation. Rather it is that, because Japan is geographically compact, retailers' reorder costs are small and households' storage costs are great.
The abundance of small stores in Japan, broadly speaking, represents an efficient adaptation to the conditions of the country.
A Model for Explaining the Density of Retail Outlets

A. General Considerations
Models that can explain the geographic density of retail outlets are an implicit feature of the spatial competition literature (Capozza and Van Order (1978) , Salop (1979) , Heal (1980) , Novshek (1980) ). My approach differs from that of the spatial competition literature in two ways. One is that I assume that retailers, as well as households, have Baumol-type storage and reorder technologies, whereas in the spatial competition literature the technology of retailing usually is not specified except to assert that economies of scale are present. (Heal (1980) is a notable exception.) The purpose of my assumption is to introduce consumers' and retailers' inventory costs in a way that is informative but tractable.
The other difference is that I assume that, except for regulatory effects, the geographic density of retail outlets minimizes the households'
and retailers' combined storage and reorder costs. The spatial competition literature makes no such assumption. Indeed, a typical result of spatial competition models is that the socially optimal number of retail stores is attained only by the merest coincidence if at all. The reason for assuming social optimality is that it enables one to ignore the pricing behavior of the sellers. This is an advantage because (pure) Nash equilibrium mill pricing strategies need not exist in the environment I propose. The social optimality assumption amounts to the claim that retailing attains technological efficiency.
B. Assumptions
Households. Let households be uniformly arrayed with density D across an unbounded plane.
Nondurable good. Suppose that each household consumes some nondurable good at rate q which is the same for all households and is independent of ^On this point see Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986) . In their terminology, my model gives rise to "transportation costs" of consumers that are proportionate to the square root of the distance to the store for nondurables and proportionate to the distance to the store for durables, and "production costs" of stores that are proportionate to the square root of quantity supplied. both the good's price and the household's storage and reorder costs. Let each household have storage costs equal to k per unit of average inventory of the nondurable good. Further, suppose that each time a household reorders it incurs costs equal to r times the distance from the household to the nearest retail outlet. We presume that each household chooses a frequency of reorder for the nondurable that minimizes its own storage and reorder costs.
Durable good. Suppose that each household maintains a stock of some durable good equal to one unit of it and that it replaces the unit at the exogenously determined rate q which is the same for all households. Let the households not have storage costs for the durable. Households have no decisions to make regarding the durable good. The density of retailers that minimizes this cost is that which equates the marginal reduction in the households' storage and reorder costs with the marginal increase in the retailers' storage and reorder costs.
For nondurable goods the solution to (12) Exogenous changes that increase households' costs of storage and reorder induce an increase in the density of retail outlets, which economizes by shifting more of the storage and reorder costs onto the retailers. Exogenous changes that increase the retailers' costs of storage and reorder induce a fall in the density of retail outlets, which economizes by shifting more of the storage and reorder costs back to the households.
Greater geographic density of households in a sense implies greater reorder efficiency of the representative household and induces a disproportionately small increase in the density of retail outlets. Geographic density of retailers of durable goods is less sensitive to variation in density of consumers than is that of retailers of nondurables. Density of retailers of durable goods, however, is sensitive to flow demand of the representative household, whereas density of nondurables retailers is not.
Overemployment in family enterprises might be thought of as, in effect, lowering retailers' cost parameters R and K, inducing more outlets. In a global sense this phenomenon is wasteful (It is maintained that the families would be more productive in alternative pursuits), but from the view of consumers, the cost of physically transporting goods through the distribution system is made less by it.
Regulation such as under Japan's Large Scale Retail Store Law can be treated as establishing lower bounds on the geographic density of retail stores. The precise placement of this lower bound will reflect local political conditions. Results are reported in Table 1 . The ln(points-of-sale/household) model performed rather better than the ln(establishments/household) model, but results were similar for both. The only kind of business that neither model at all fit was "general merchandise", i.e. department stores. This might be a reflection of regulatory effects. For the other kinds of business the model performed well. As the analytic model had enabled us to predict, the population density variable was inversely related to retailers per household and the size of the effect generally was estimated to be larger for nondurables than for durables. Also as predicted, for nondurables other than gasoline, the tatami mats per person variable and motor vehicles per household variable were inversely related to retailers per household, where significant. For durables and for gasoline, these variables were positively related to retailers per household, where significant. I would explain this last result as due to tatami mats per person being related to the scale of flow demand for apparel and furniture, and motor vehicles per household being related to the geographic density of households actually demanding gasoline or cars.
Empirical Estimation
The coefficients on the logarithm of department stores per household do generally support the claim that bureaucratic obstacles to the opening of department stores have acted to increase the numbers of small stores. The elasticity of number of other stores to the number of department stores ranges from essentially zero in the case of motor vehicles, gasoline, and drugs and toiletries, to minus ten percent to minus twenty percent in the case of food, liquor, and apparel. There are about five times as many food stores per household in Japan as in the U.S. but only about one fifth as many department stores per household. (See Table 2 ). Can we say that if in Japan there were five times more department stores there would be four fifths fewer food stores? According to the estimated coefficient for food stores the answer is no. We would observe about one fourth fewer food stores. I conclude that while the cross-sectional evidence does demonstrate that regulation has contributed to the proliferation of small stores in Japan, regulation is not the only nor most important factor in explaining why there are so many small stores in Japan. To identify other important reasons for the Japanese structure of retailing I turn to a Japan-U.S.
comparison of households' and retailers' costs.
B. Japan-US variation in storage and reorder costs First, the generally higher population density of Japan would seem to favor fewer retailers per household than in the U.S., which is quite the opposite of what is observed for most kinds of business. See the first column of Table 2a and of Table 2b for numbers of retailers engaged in each kind of business per household in Japan and the U.S. Second, any tendency towards greater division of labor within Japanese households than in American ones, with greater specialization in shopping in Japan, would tend to lower the reorder costs of households there (lower r), inducing fewer stores, not more. To the extent Japanese derive pleasure from shopping, this too lowers the households' reorder costs and has similar effects.
Third, the generally cramped living conditions and consequently high storage costs of nondurable goods for Japanese households (high k), would tend to favor more nondurables retailers in Japan, if the ultimate cause of the cramped living conditions, the high land prices, did not also cause retailers to have proportionately higher storage costs (high K). The positive sign on "tatami mats per person" in the nondurables retailers regressions, does indicate sensitivity of numbers of stores to households' storage costs, within Japan. Also, data to be described below indicate that retailers' storage costs are not very different between Japan and the U.S..
High household storage costs probably are a factor in explaining why there are so many more (nondurables) retail stores per person in Japan compared to the U.S.. Finally, the relative magnitudes of storage and reorder costs of Japanese and American retailers can be inferred from available data.
Assuming optimizing behavior by retailers as described in Section ID, one easily finds that each retailer's storage and reorder costs divided by two times his average inventory equals his storage cost per unit of average inventory. That is, By this logic retailers' operating costs divided by two times the value of average inventory measures the storage cost per unit of average inventory relative to unit value of inventory. These data are reported for Japan and the U.S. by kind of retail business in the second column of Table 2a and of   Table 2b (see Appendix A for sources). For most businesses, storage costs per unit seem to be relatively greater in Japan than in the U.S., but the difference is not large.
Also assuming optimization by retailers, average inventory divided by quantity sold in a year equals the cost of a single reorder relative to the total storage and reorder costs for the year. In the earlier notation,
By this argument, and assuming that inventory is valued approximately at retail price, the value of average inventory divided by annual sales measures the cost of a single reorder relative to total operating cost.
These data are reported for Japan and the U.S. in the last columns of Tables   2a and 2b . The statistic is generally quite a bit lower for Japan than for the U.S. and, with the exception of Drugs and Toiletries, is lower for each kind of business separately. An obvious reason for lower reorder costs in Japan than in the U.S. is that Japan is geographically compact; the distance from producer or wholesaler to retailer is therefore relatively small. An additional reason might be the abundance of displaced workers available for family enterprise; through their efforts transport costs might be reduced.
Conclusion
The more retail stores there are, the shorter is the distance from house to store for the representative consumer but the less are the scale economies in restocking the stores. Thus having more stores shifts inventory costs from consumers to retailers. In general this becomes socially optimal only if retailers are efficient at storage or reorder relative to the households, or if the geographic density of households is small.
Bureaucratic obstacles to the establishment of new department stores have increased the numbers of small stores in Japan, but not to a sufficient extent that this can be the main reason there are so many more stores per household in Japan than in other countries. Compared to the U.S., it seems that in Japan households' storage costs are high and retailers'reorder costs are low. These conditions both favor more stores per person. In this sense an abundance of small stores in Japan is an efficient adaptation to the conditions of the country (including the social conditions that channel displaced workers into family enterprise and perhaps contribute indirectly to lowering retailers' reorder costs). 
